February 1, 2003

John Iani
Regional Administrator, Region 10
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Sixth Av., Seattle, WA 98101

Kwai Chan, Assistant Inspector General
Office of Inspector General
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Av. (mail code 2460T)
Washington, DC 20460

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Boise, ID 83706
 

Brian C. Monson
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706-1255

Greetings,

Attached please find Petitioners Environmental Defense Institute, Inc, David McCoy, and Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free, Inc. comments on the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application for the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System (ILWMS).

Sincerely,

_______________________________
Chuck Broscious, Executive Director
Environmental Defense Institute
P.O. Box 220, Troy, ID 83871-0220
V. 208-835-6152; F. 298-835-5407
Email: edinst@tds.net

______________________________
David B. McCoy
2940 Redbarn Lane, Idaho Falls Idaho 83404
V. 208-542-1449; F. 208-552-0565
Email: mccoydb01@msn.com

___________________________
Erik Ringelberg, Executive Director
Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free
P. O. Box 4838, Jackson, WY 83001
V. 307-732-2040; F. 307-732-0129
Email: kynf@yellowstonenuclearfree.com

Petitioners Comments

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), and Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) Volume 14 4/12/02 Notice of Deficiency (NOD) and DOE 12/02 Response on Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) Liquid Waste Management System (ILWMS), HWMA/RCRA Part B Permit Application, for Storage and Treatment Units at the (INTEC), EPA ID NO. ID4890008952.

I. SUMMARY

The inadequacy of the DOE's response to credible DEQ challenges are noted below along with some additional technical issues regarding INEEL emissions not raised by the DEQ staff review, but which petitioners raise at this time. It must also be noted that the DEQ technical staff has asked many regulatory questions which remain unresolved by the DOE December 2002 Response to the NOD. Petitioners request that this submission be officially received by DEQ and additionally logged in for consideration on its own merits under IDAPA 58.01.05.013 [40 CFR §§ 124.32(b)(2)(ii)] - the RCRA Expanded Public Participation Rule.

Below is substantive support of DEQ technical staff, additional matters raised by Petitioners and the basis of Petitioners' request to DEQ management to deny the ILWMS RCRA permit. For the same type of reasons that the DEQ responsibly denied the NWCF Calciner RCRA Part B application and the WERF RCRA Part B application, the DEQ should similarly reject the ILWMS Part B application for its failure to provide facts and evidence that the application shows compliance with RCRA.

II. MATTERS NOT COVERED BY THE DEQ STAFF REVIEW IN THE APRIL 2002 NOD TO DOE AND THE SUBSEQUENT DOE RESPONSE THERETO.

It has come to Petitioner's attention from review of recent Department of Energy (DOE) documents that hazardous material and hazardous air pollutants (HAP) emissions from the DOE Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) significantly exceed the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) limits, and the Clean Air Act (CAA) Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards. Below please find discussion and documentation from the INEEL Final September 2002 High-level Waste Environmental Impact Statement that substantiates this view. We specifically request that this "Supplement" be joined with our previous submittal(s) (identified above) related to our allegations of DOE violations of environmental laws at INEEL.

Under 40 CFR 264.1032(a), and 265.1032 Process Vent Standards that applies to fractionators, and evaporators that states; "Reduce total organic emissions from all affected process vents at the facility below 1.4 kg/hr (3 lb/hr) AND 2.8 Mg/yr (3.1 tons/yr), or, "Reduce by use of a control devise, total organic emissions from all effected process vents ...by 95 weight percent."

Under 40 CFR 63.112 Major Source: "Section 112(a)(1) of the Act defines a major source as: any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential - to - emit considering controls, in the aggregate 10 tons per year (tpy) or more of any [hazardous air pollutant] HAP or 25 tpy or more of any combination of HAP." [ FR 57574 10/26/99 final ruling] "The term 'major source' is defined in 40 CFR part 63, Subpart A- General Provisions, and includes the requirement for considering emissions and the potential for emissions from co-located sources when determining major source status. Therefore, the major source determination must be based on facility-wide emissions." [FR 75756 10/26/99]

DOE/ID documentation (see Attachments) show the above cited regulatory limits are substantially exceeded.

The bottom line is INEEL exceeds the hazardous air pollutants regulatory limit for organics by 154 % for annual releases, and 700% on the maximum per hour limit on releases. We believe that DOE has known that the emissions have exceeded regulatory thresholds for implementation of emission controls. DOE has failed to provide the emission controls mandated for reducing these emissions. This has put public health and safety unnecessarily at risk by DOE waste processing at INEEL.

Additionally, INEEL Final September 2002 High-level Waste EIS Table 4-1I page 4-34 lists Actual Site wide volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emissions for 1996 at maximum hourly 59 kg/hr, and annual average at 16,000 kg/hr (16 Mg/hr); 1997 maximum hourly at 37 kg/hr and annual average at 27,000 kg/hr (27 Mg/hr). Again, this data still greatly exceeds the regulatory limits of maximum per hour 1.4 kg/hr and annual 2.8 Mg/hr. This more current data/documentation supercedes discrepancies in the 1999 RCRA Application and the 1995 PEIS.

40 CFR 1032 (a); Standards for Process Vents; applies to fractionators, and evaporators. "Reduce total organic emissions from all affected process vents at the facility below 1.4 kg/hr (3 lb/hr) AND 2.8 Mg/yr (3.1 tons/yr), or, "Reduce by use of a control devise, total organic emissions from all effected process vents ...by 95 weight percent." [The sum of organics annual average is 4317 kg/yr (4.317 Mg/yr) and the sum of maximum hourly releases is 97.60 kg/hr according to RCRA 12/99 Application and PEIS table4.7-1 that show the limits were violated.

These air emission regulatory violations have been known by EPA and IDEQ for at least seven years, yet no action has been take to force the shutdown of these mixed hazardous and radioactive waste processing operations until such time DOE can demonstrate compliance. See Table below.

Above Table Notes:

    a. DOE Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and INEEL Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) 1995, Volume 1, Appendix B, Table 4.7-1, p 4.7-5. Total organics is derived by adding listed organics.
    b. INEEL Final September 2002 High-level Waste Environmental Impact Statement, Table 4-1I page 4-34 lists Actual Site wide Volatile Organic Compounds emissions.
    c. Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) 40 CFR 264.1032(a) and 265.1032(a). Contaminate units in the CFR's are Mg/yr = million grams/year. 1000 kg/yr = 1 Mg/yr.
    d. 1995 PEIS (see a above), Table 4.7-1 total of all Hazardous Air Pollutants. There are dozens of other regulated hazardous air pollutants emitted based on RCRA Permit Application Waste Codes, however data available only allows this incomplete summary.
    e. See Clean Air Act 40 CFR 63.112. Major Source: "Section 112(a)(1) of the Act defines a major source as: any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential - to - emit considering controls, in the aggregate 10 tons per year (TPY) or more of any [hazardous air pollutant] HAP or 25 tpy or more of any combination of HAP." [ FR 57574 10/26/99 final ruling] "The term 'major source' is defined in 40 CFR part 63, Subpart A- General Provisions, and includes the requirement for considering emissions and the potential for emissions from co-located sources when determining major source status. Therefore, the major source determination must be based on facility-wide emissions." [FR 75756 10/26/99]
    40 CFR 63.113(a)(2) Process Vents; "Reduce emissions of total organic hazardous air pollutants by 98 weight percent or to a concentration of 20 parts per million by volume, whichever is less stringent."
    f. The data in the above table is incomplete because the information gained through Freedom of Information Act and the State of Idaho's Public Information Requests are incomplete, however partially released data shows significant violation of federal and state environmental laws.

III. DOE NOD DECEMBER 2002 NOD RESPONSE COMMENTS ADDRESSED BY NUMERICAL SEQUENCE.

Petitioners's Comments below reference DOE/INEEL's (~7/02) numerical sequence applied to DEQ's un-numbered April 2002 NOD.

2. IDEQ states; "Because the ETS [High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE)] is an integral part of the ILWMS and is currently operating under interim status ⁽¹⁾ the DEQ will draft a Schedule of Compliance for permitting the ETS, and include it in the Part B Permit Application that is to be presented to the public for review and comment in the future." INEEL's response to this is to "submit a Class 3 Permit Modification Request to add the ETS within 180 days of the effective date of the Volume 14 final partial permit."

Delay in making application for the ETS (HLLWE) which is an integral part of the ILWMS is not reasonable given that the ETS operates without legal RCRA interim status and without a permit. The ETS (HLLWE) is a new facility that required a full part B permit prior to the initiation of operations.

5. Sparging releases up to 75% of VOC and 40% of SVOC. "40 CFR 264 Subpart AA include process vents associated with the air stripping operations that manages hazardous wastes with organic concentration of at least 10 ppmw." "It appears that the loss of volatile and semi-volatile organic, due to sparging, corresponds with the definition of air stripping operation [a desorption operation employed to transfer on or more volatile components from a liquid mixture into a gas (air) either with or without the application of heat to the liquid]."
    INEEL claims that only the CPP-601 "Deep Tanks are continuously sparged for criticality control." There are four of these "Deep Tanks" all in the 4,500 gallon range, and that alone is a significant air stripping operation. It begs the question as to how many other tanks are sparged possibly on an intermittent, non-continuous basis. INEEL can not legitimately claim that since sparging is used to control criticality it is not also air stripping when the net effect is release of VOCs. Given the explosion hazard of VOCs in the evaporators, INEEL has good reason to eliminate the VOCs prior to treatment. See later (#51) comments on this hazard that DEQ brings up in addition to DOE's own classification some 29 tanks are listed as "Tank Treatment T01." INEEL's claim that they "administratively control" lab dumping in the tanks to ensure compliance with the 3/lb/hr limit is non-compliant because they later admit that they are not monitoring for VOC at the main stack. Additionally, waste codes for the PEWE and the tank farm show VOC and Semi-VOC. So controlling the lab dumping does not absolve INEEL from monitoring/ sampling regulations.

6. DEQ identifies 40 CFR 264.600 Subpart X (Miscellaneous Units) as the applicable regulation for air emissions.[See EDI CFR Review] And both a screening and full risk assessment are required.
    INEEL's response; "The units within the PEWE and LET&D that are regulated under 40 CFR ss264 Subpart X." DOE fails to include the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator (ETS) and its related off-gas and tanks. Moreover the Risk Assessment (INEEL claims is in the Permit) reported is not based on verifiable sampling data to substantiate the findings and only includes the PEWE and LET&D thus understating the emissions that otherwise would include the operating ETS. The ETS must be included in the analysis of the ILWMS because it is "an integral part of the system."

7. INEEL cannot claim exemption of off-gas lines because by their own admission "the off-gas lines [that] are sloped to drain to low spots located throughout the off-gas system...[and that] each low spot where hazardous waste may accumulate is equipped with a drain line that drains to an HWMA/RCRA regulated tank system..." These lines have mixed hazardous waste in them.

17. DEQ challenges Hypalon tank liner ability to meet 264.192(a) secondary containment. INEEL claims material certification, but at issue is that this is a retrofit, which means they had to piece the material around the bottom of the tank, so the weakness is not only the joints in the Hypalon but also the tank bottom and supports where the liner could not be put.

18. DEQ challenges use of epoxy paint as secondary liner. DOE claims to provide "specifications for typical epoxy paint used" which may not be the actual paint for this vault especially given the tank was installed in 1961 and an unknown design life. DOE claims compatible with waste material except for strong oxidants that are not managed in the Westside Waste Holdup (WWH) tanks. The spalling that always occurs on the concrete substrate would further limit the life of the epoxy paint. PE certification must include actual inspection of the current condition and what a reasonable extended life would be.
    INEEL 10/4/02 Technology Need Statement notes extensive corrosion damage to the ILWMS evaporators due to current chloride concentrations of 1500 mg/L and projected concentrations of 5000 mg/L. These represent significant contradictions.

22. Covers flooding issue....also see # 12 [40 CFR 270.114(b)(19)] DOE relies on the old studies and not the current USGS studies. See EDI Amicus Brief on INTEC Debris Processing Permit appeal by David McCoy.

23. DEQ questions completeness of points of waste generation. DOE only responds with "typical waste managed in ILWMS."

24. DEQ requests waste characterization. DOE's response "The ILWMS primarily manages mixed wastes. Other nonhazardous (e.g., radioactive-only wastes) may also be processed by the PEWE and LET&D. RCRA regulations do not require specific information on the radioactive nature of mixed wastes to be included in a Part B Permit Application. Waste characterization information, including radioactive waste analysis, is maintained in the operating record and is available to regulating agencies upon inspection."
    RCRA Universal Treatment standards 40 CFR 268 Land Disposal Restrictions have specific radioactive requirements. It is inconceivable that there would be non-hazardous waste...the only material that might qualify is bomb grade HEU or Plutonium. Moreover, the continuous co-mingling of waste in the tanks makes this even more unlikely.
    DOE refers back to response # 1 which is just a vague short list of possible waste sources...not a credible waste characterization. Additionally, because the public is entitled to review the Part B Application, the full information must be made available to the public as part of the application and not "only to the regulating agencies."

25. DEQ questions meeting chemical and physical analysis requirements in 264.13(a) and 270.14(b)(2). DOE's response is inadequate because the agency failed to include descriptions of what must be provided by the generators demonstrating waste acceptability to the ILWMS.

26. DEQ questions adequacy of RCRA waste characterization (262.11) and "Since information pertaining to the process sampling activities is lacking, the Revised Part B Permit application must include details of all analyses performed (parameters, test methods, applicable rationale for selecting each test method, etc.), and clearly identify all sampling locations and the analyses performed at each location."
    DOE's response is basically to brush this question off by claiming the requirement is there in section C-2a despite DEQ's inability to find it and therefore, DOE's response is incomplete and inadequate.

27. DEQ states: "Given that 28 EPA hazardous waste numbers are listed in the Part A Application for the ILWMS input feed stream, evaporation and fractionation will not be the correct treatment method for each constituent. Since DOE is considering both treatments as pre-treatment activities, demonstrate actions currently being planned to ensure the waste will be treated with the correct treatment method to meet requirements pertaining to Land Disposal Restrictions (LDRs), IDAPA 58.01.05.001 [40 CFR 268]."
    DOE blows off answering the question by saying the final decision is yet to be determined. But in reality the approved high-level waste tank closure plan that leaves the sediments/heels has already been made. There is no final treatment!!! This is in violation of the fundamental RCRA requirement of "cradle to grave" management. FR Vol.63. No.100 40 CFR 268(V)(D). See Attachment B, EDI Amicus Brief in NRDC vs. DOE related to INEEL High Level Waste Tank and DOE's decision to leave tank heels permanently in place. This EDI Brief addresses in part:
            1. "The effect that the arbitrary, capricious and alleged illegal DOE Order 435.1 is having on specific      INEEL operations not currently made available to the Court by Plaintiffs or the subsequent amicus brief submitted from the State of Idaho. 2. The effect DOE Order 435.1 has on EDI supporters and the general public whose health and safety will be irrevocably harmed; 3. How DOE Order 435.1 violates not only NWPA bu also RCRA and other relevant and federal statutes applicable to the treatment, storage and disposal of HLLW." ⁽²⁾

28. DEQ claims "Of the 28 hazardous waste numbers (HWN), four are listed HWNs and 23 are characteristic HWMs which can be accepted into the ILWMS." DOE responds that "process knowledge" is also used to determine HWNs.
    EDI believes DEQ got their numbers reversed. All four RCRA characteristic classifications apply and there are 23 specifically listed HWNs. Actually, the 23 HWNs needs to be checked against the waste codes in the Part A which lists ~ 127 HWN for the PEWE. To qualify as a RCRA hazardous waste must either exhibit one of the four "characteristic" [D001 - Ignitable; D002 - Corrosive; D003 - Reactive; D004 - Toxic][40 CFR 261.11 Subpart C] and/or be individually named and assigned a waste code number [261.30 Subpart B]. These generally apply to solid waste, waste-waters, and non-waste-waters.
    The above RCRA lists are separate from CAA Hazardous Air Pollutants, however there is some over lap [42 U.S.C. 7412 & 40 CFR 63 Subpart DD]

29. DEQ challenges page C-7 where DOE excludes the characteristic ignitability (D001) waste claimed not received into the ETS and LET&D systems. DOE responds by adding it back in without describing the consequences or the legality of processing such waste in the ILWMS, however, DOE does not commit to the requisite monitoring/sampling required for organics.

30. DEQ challenges C-7 where DOE "Describes how the characteristic of corrosivity (D002) is controlled out of the Westside Holdup Storage (WWH) tanks." DOE claims they no longer dump corrosive waste in these WWH tanks because the service lines are not compatible and need to be upgraded. "These upgrades would include replacement of the tile-encased transfer lines with piping that has secondary containment compatible with corrosives, lining of the vaults with stainless steel, and upgrade of the instrumentation, a sampler upgrade, and vessel offgas improvements."
    These above revealing admissions to non-compliant secondary containment also would prohibit use of these tanks for any RCRA waste, not just D002. Moreover the tanks are not empty and therefore still contain D002 waste. An issue is raised as to whether the tanks are RCRA permitted for storage.

31. DEQ challenges "whether or not hazardous constituents are present in the vessel offgas released due to tank sparging and the process offgas from evaporation and fractionation activities, before they are discharged to the atmosphere through the INTEC main stack."
    DOE responds "No analyses are routinely performed to demonstrate whether or not hazardous constituents are present in the vessel offgas released due to tank sparging and the process offgas from evaporation and fractionation activities, before they are discharged to the atmosphere through the INTEC main stack. However, INTEC Balance of Plant (BOP) sampling is currently being performed to determine typical constituents throughout the ILWMS. This BOP sampling includes analysis of offgas associated with the ETS, PEWE, and LET&D. BOP sampling began in 1998 and is still ongoing."
    The above is an admission that DOE is violating the monitoring/sampling requirements for all applicable waste codes, but also that they have no credible basis to claim that emissions are below regulatory limits in 40 CFR 264 Subpart AA. The BOP does not meet this requirement.

35. DOE response that "Evaporator bottoms and condensed overheads are not analyzed for compatibility prior to transfer to the PEWE Bottoms Collection Tanks, the Process Condensate Collection Tanks, or the LET&D facility" confirms why the waste codes for all these operations must be the same because DOE is not sampling. This is particularly important given all the "F" waste codes in the Debris Processing that have yet to be included in the ILWMS waste codes.

38. DOE acknowledges "off-site waste" is processed. This off-site waste processed at INTEC is important to meet qualifications in the CAA major source criteria [40 CFR 63.112 and 403.1] and then the applicability of the MACT emission standards [40 CFR 63.680 Subpart DD].

39. "DEQ cannot concur with the use of process knowledge to characterize wastes before entering the PEWE system, unless DOE provides documents, as described in the guidance manual, showing that the process knowledge can be acceptable."
    DOE offers a non-responsive answer: "Since the ILWMS manages radioactive mixed wastes, it is appropriate to apply acceptable knowledge [in place of sampling and analysis] when characterizing wastes."
    The only way process knowledge can be used is if the operator can document that a particular hazardous material has never been and likely never will be used or processed at the facility to avoid monitoring/sampling for that specific hazardous material. DOE has failed to provide adequate documentation as required by 40 CFR 264.1034(d)(2).

40 CFR 264.1034(d)(2) states: "Using knowledge of the waste to determine that its total organic concentration is less than 10 ppmw. Documentation of the waste determination is required. Examples of documentation that shall be used to support a determination under this provision include production process information documenting that no organic compounds are used, information that the waste is generated by a process that is identical to a process at the same or another facility that has previously been demonstrated by direct measurement to generate a waste stream having a total organic content less than 10 ppmw, or prior speciation analysis results on the same waste stream where it can also be documented that no process changes have occurred since that analysis that could affect the waste total organic concentration."
    1034(e) states: "The determination that distillation, fractionation, thin-film evaporation, solvent extraction, or air or steam stripping operations manage hazardous wastes with time-weighted, annual average total organic concentrations less than 10 ppmw shall be made as follows: (1) By the effective date that the facility becomes subject to the provisions of this subpart or by the date when the waste is first managed in a waste management unit, whichever is later, and (2) For continuously generated waste, annually, or (3) Whenever there is a change in the waste being managed or a change in the process that generates or treats the waste. (f) When an owner or operator and the Regional Administrator do not agree on whether a distillation, fractionation, thin-film evaporation, solvent extraction, or air or steam stripping operation manages a hazardous waste with organic concentrations of at least 10 ppmw based on knowledge of the waste, the procedures in Method 8260 of SW-846 (incorporated by reference under Sec. 260.11) may be used to resolve the dispute. [55 FR 25494, June 21, 1990, as amended at 61 FR 59951, Nov. 25, 1996; 62 FR 32462, June 13, 1997]"
    DOE's use of process knowledge might possibly hold water ONLY in relation to listing individual radionuclide waste contaminates. But mixed waste as a category is covered in the LDRs, Universal Treatment Standards, Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and the Clean Air Act.
    DOE however includes "knowledge of the raw materials used to generate a waste; knowledge of the process generating the waste; chemical/material composition specifications.."
    Additionally, the requirements of Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHC) is not complied with!

40. DOE cannot credibly verify with sampling data that; "Before being received into the PEWE system, the waste undergoes RCRA characterization in accordance with 40 CFR 262.11.

41. DEQ challenges DOE statement; "The LDRs remain until the waste is treated to a final waste form." "This statement is incorrect because the LDRs are also attached to the final waste form."
    DOE's responses are extremely revealing. "Since the PEWE and LET&D systems are segments of an overall treatment train, LDR requirements identified at the point of generation are carried through the entire ILWMS. Compliance with the treatment standards specified in IDAPA 58.01.05.011 (40 CFR 268) will be evaluated following treatment in the treatment alternative selected by the DOE. Required LDR notifications will be prepared prior to shipment of any treatment residuals. LDR applicability is determined for each waste at the point of generation based on the EPA HWNs assigned to individual waste streams. Before receipt into the ILWMS, wastes undergo initial characterization for EPA HWN applicability and LDR requirements. Once LDR's are identified, they remain applicable through treatment and or disposal fo the final waste form. This final waste form will depend on the ultimate treatment alternative selected by the DOE. Final assessment and compliance with LDR treatment standards will take place before land disposal by evaluating the final waste form. This will take place onsite and appropriate LDR documentation will be provided to the disposal facility in accordance with IDAPA 58.01.05.011 (40 CFR 268)."
    The above DOE responsive statement sounds good given that they acknowledge their operation must comply with the stated laws, but has little credibility given the fact that two high-level waste tanks are being closed in violation of the LDR and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. See comments on # 27 above. Moreover, the Application must be denied until such time as there is a legally compliant "cradle to grave" path for the waste. DOE has broken so many promises over the decades that the agency's word holds limited credibility.

44. DOE's statement; "Since process sampling is conducted to ensure optimum performance of the treatment units, not for RCRA characterization of the waste, strict adherence to the protocol for the test methods identified in Table C-1 is not required."
    This is prime-facie evidence of non-compliance with 40 CFR 264 Subpart AA.

46. DEQ challenges using process knowledge for waste characterization. See Petitioners comments on # 39 CFR citations related to this regulatory issue and the very narrow use of process knowledge allowed under the regulations. DOE does not meet this exemption standard.
    Also see Attachment E Code of Federal Regulations Review for a detailed analysis of the regulations and the alleged violations of 40 CFR 264, and 265, and 40 CFR 63.

50. DOE acknowledges another reference to "off-site" waste processed. This off-site waste processed at INTEC is important to meet qualifications in the CAA major source criteria [40 CFR 63.112 and 403.1] and then the applicability of the MACT emission standards [40 CFR 63.680 Subpart DD] which kicks in CAA/MACT standards.

51. DEQ challenges: "Although the ILWMS does not accept reactive waste (i.e., D003 HWN is not on the RCRA Part A Permit), the evaporators may create a potentially explosive self-sustaining tributyl phosphate (TBP)-nitric acid reaction at a temperature of 186 degrees C/367 degrees F (1/31/01 letter from B.R. Monson to D.N. Rasch regarding operational temperature limits, thermal decomposition products and the effects of chloride and nitric acid on the PEWE materials of construction)." [emphasis added]
    As previously noted by EDI, INEEL 10/4/02 Science and Technology Need Statement notes extensive corrosion damage to the ILWMS evaporators due to current chloride concentrations of 1500 mg/L and projected concentrations of 5000 mg/L resulting from waste concentration operations. These represent significant contradictions.
    DOE's response confirms "extremely exothermic [reactions] at 186 degrees C" but claims the evaporators operate at 108 degrees C for PEWE and 118 degree C for LET&D. "However, since the operating temperatures of the PEW evaporators and LET&D fractionators are high enough to sustain a hexone/nitric acid reaction, under the appropriate conditions, the concentration of total organic carbon (TOC) allowed in the feed to the ILWMS is limited to 1100 mg/L."
    This begs the question of what temperature do the chemicals become at all exothermic? Additionally, given the fact that for the evaporators to function as waste volume reduction units, they must operate in excess of the boiling point of water (100 degrees C), and with such a small temperature safety margin, DOE must be required to conduct performance tests to demonstrate the operational monitoring sensitivity and that proper controls exist to shut down the evaporators before reaching any temperature where any exothermic reaction would occur.
    Moreover, as previously noted, DOE is not adequately characterizing the waste to claim the total organic carbon concentrations (TOC) are below 1100 mg/l as stated. Also DOE is not including the ETS or the high-level waste tanks here which will possibly provide additional complications in waste characterization.

52. DEQ challenges DOE claims to waste compatibility. DOE's response is inadequate because it is not based on verifiable sampling/characterization of the waste (i.e., non-verifiable process knowledge).

53. DEQ challenges ignitable wastes. DOE responds that due to sparging "the characteristic of ignitability is lost." Apparently "lost" out the stack! It is operationally understandable why DOE would want to limit ignitable and other VOC/SVOC from the throughput to the evaporators to minimize the explosion hazard, however, DOE is required to provide off-gas filtration systems to prevent these VOCs from being exhausted to the atmosphere. Currently, only particulate HEPA filters are employed which does not meet 40 CFR 63.680.

54. DEQ challenges C-3a compliance with final waste form in the 40 CFR 268 LDR treatment standards. Also see Petitioners comments in # 29, and 31.
    Again, DOE dodges the requirement saying it will eventually take place under 40 CFR 268.7. The absence of a time certain to meet the requirement demonstrates that DOE cannot comply with the current requirement.

56. DEQ challenges compliance with 40 CFR264 Subpart AA, BB, and CC, as well as 264.1030, 1050, and 1080. DOE's claim to maximum total organic compounds (TOC) to be less than 300 ug/ml (ppm) can not be credibly validated. Also "If the samples were taken after the waste is sparged for mixing, the inputs to the PEWE must have lost most of the volatile and semi-volatile organics."
    DOE also claims "PEWE sampling results are included in the BOP sampling results.."are non-compliant. See EDI comments on # 31. Circular argument. DOE keeps referring back to a previous argument claiming its legitimacy, yet its original legitimacy was never established. See EDI Attached CFR Review.

58. DEQ challenges "Demonstrate how the total organic emission from all affected process vents at the ILWMS can be maintained below 3 lb./hr. and 3.1 tons/yr." DOE's response again refers back to #5. See Attached EDI CFR Review that documents INEEL accedence of these regulatory limits that states in part; 40 CFR 264.1032 (a); Standards for Process Vents; applies to fractionators, and evaporators.
    "Reduce total organic emissions from all affected process vents at the facility below 1.4 kg/hr (3 lb/hr) AND 2.8 Mg/yr (3.1 tons/yr), or, "Reduce by use of a control devise, total organic emissions from all effected process vents ...by 95 weight percent." [The sum of organics annual average is 4317 kg/yr (4.317 Mg/yr) and the sum of maximum hourly releases is 97.60 kg/hr according to RCRA 12/99 Application shows violates these limits

59. DEQ challenges "The offgases generated from various ILWMS operations are routed through the INTEC offgas system and eventually discharge through the INTEC main stack sump. Clarify if there is a sampling capability to determine the organic emission exited through the INTEC main stack sump. Having the ability to determine the organic emission exited through the INTEC main stack sump, the DOE would be able to measure the total organic emissions from all affected process vents at the ILWMS."
    DOE's response; "The LET&D off gas system was upgraded in 2001 to eliminate condensation of liquids in the sump. There is no sampling capability for the INTEC main stack sump; however, the sump is equipped with a level detector that would notify facility personnel of the presence of liquids. Since the completion of the LET&D offgas upgrade project, no liquids have been detected in the main stack sump."[emphasis added]
    DOE's above response largely does not answer the regulatory question of compliance with 40 CFR 264.1030 Subpart AA and are grounds for denial of the Permit.
    Also, it is uncertain how much HAP goes out the HVAC stack in addition to the INTEC Main Stack. If VOC sampling is initiated, it is required that the samples be taken prior (upstream) from the dilution with the ventilation discharges.
    See Attached EDI CFR Review for documentation on CAA/MACT violations.

60. DEQ; "Demonstrate how requirements for test methods and procedures for process vents, as set forth in IDAPA 58.01.05.008 [40 CFR 264.1032] are met for the LLWMS."
    DOE's response is "no test methods are required." Again, Petitioners believe that this is grounds to deny ILWMS Permit under 40 CFR 264.1043.

61. DEQ challenges DOE's record keeping requirements in IDAPA 58.01.05.008 [40 CFR 264.1035]. DOE's inadequate response, again, grounds to deny Permit.

62. DEQ challenges DOE's Reporting requirements in IDAPA 58.01.05.008 [40 CFR 264.1036]
    DOE inadequate response: "Inventory is monitored to ensure the 3 lb/hr limit is not exceeded." Acknowledges applicability of 264 Subpart AA.. Again see EDI CFR Review.

63. DEQ "Based on the information provided in a meeting between representatives from the DEQ and INEEL held on 2/8/01, some of the ILWMS tank systems are sparged continuously for mixing. The loss of volatile and semi-volatile organics, due to sparging, corresponds with the definition of air stripping operation (a desorption operation employed to transfer one or more volatile components from a liquid mixture into a gas (air) either with or without the application of heat to the liquid). Therefore, it appears that air sparging constitutes "treatment," as per IDAPA 58.01.05.004 [40 CFR 260.10]."
    DOE responds that "the Deep Tanks are the only units sparged continuously. The process codes T01 and S02 apply to the Deep Tanks."
    This again bags the question of other non-continuously sparged tanks. RCRA Work Plan 11/12/02 notes 29 "tank treatment" units (T01). As previously noted, the four Deep Tanks (at 4,500 gal/ea) alone are a major sparging operation.

65. DEQ challenges "how solids in this [ILWMS] tank area will be managed."
    DOE's response; "The full sediment tank will be managed as a RCRA solid waste and disposed in accordance with all applicable regulations. However, if the solids content in the PEWE feed remains low, the INEEL may elect not to install a new feed sediment tank." [i.e., leave the tank and sediments permanently in place]
    This is a grossly inadequate response. These tanks have sufficient fissile nuclides in them that DOE considers them a criticality hazard, and thus the sparging among other tank treatment operations. These tank contents represent a major regulatory issue that DOE is not addressing. Moreover, the issue involves all waste tanks not just the sediment unit (VES-WL-132) DOE tried to limit the discussion to. Also see #69 below.
    EPA Region 10 issued a 12/4/02 Notice of Violation and Penalty ($170,000) related to INEEL failure to implement CERCLA (FFA/CO) and the continuing contamination of the Snake River Aquifer with radionuclides and hazardous waste.

66. DEQ; "Both tanks VES-WL-132 and 133 appear to receive wastes from various sources before entering the evaporators. Provide additional information describing the criteria, if any, for a waste source to be received by either tank .."
    DOE's response: "There are not other criteria for differentiating the liquid waste sent to these tanks."
    This contradicts # 65 above DOE's previous statements that organic and other reactive waste are not dumped in these tanks.

69. DEQ notes; "Tank-treatment process code is assigned to the majority of the tank systems within the ILWMS. Provide a brief explanation of what constitutes "tank treatment" for each tank system."
    DOE's inadequate response does not answer the question of what treatment "for EACH tank system" but rather only offers a vague generalized answer. There is no way to evaluate if it meets specific treatment standards.

70. DEQ challenges DOE's attempt to claim exemption for six sumps under emergency structure exemption in 265.1(c)(11)(i).
    DOE claims "These sumps are not used routinely" and complies with 264.1(g)(8)(i) "immediate response situation." DOE fails to set forth how the emergency sumps are in compliance with the regulatory requirements.

77. DOE offers no evidence if the Professional Engineer (PE) certification is based on the PE's actual physical inspection. If not it has no credibility. Due to the age of the facilities (~40 years) an actual physical inspection by the PE is indicated to ensure the certification meets regulatory current requirements.

80. DEQ challenges as with # 77 above the required (264.193) independence of PE Fluor Daniel DEQ is unable to verify if Fluor Daniel, INC., was independent of the contractors." Fluor Daniel built the system and continues to contract with INEEL, therefore the company cannot be considered independent due to conflict of interest.

81. DEQ challenges adequacy of the LET&D certification with a long list of what it should have, and DOE response fails to adequately address the question. See EDI's Attached ILWMS Tank list.

84. DEQ challenges vent systems as to what vent is exhausted where, and "Provide detailed information pertaining to the INTEC Vessel Off Gas (VOG) system, e.g., system descriptions, control, materials of construction, treatment abilities, limiting parameters, etc."
    DOE responds with a brief and inadequate description for the PEWE and LET&D vent systems but nothing for the ETS. More importantly, the only filters used are HEPAs for particulates, nothing for VOC, SVOC or volatilized metals (e.g., mercury). The LDR Universal Treatment standards in 268 are not met, and dilution can not be used to meet CAA Process Vent Emission standards.
    DOE acknowledges; "All ILWMS storage and treatment systems discharge gases such as instrument air purges ... air spargers (agitators), and gases displaced from a vessel when it fills with liquid. Gasses from the PEWE vent to the CPP-604 VOG system."
    The above statement acknowledges that sparging is used in PEWE tanks as well in contradiction to DOE claim that only the WWH tanks are sparged.
    DEQ must compare the flow rates (cubic feet per minute) of the VOG to the building ventilation system to quantify dilution.

101. DOE's claims to exempt various non-compliant tanks and service lines (i.e., Westside Waste Holdup [WWH]) by calling them "inactive" does not meet regulatory requirements unless these systems are listed for immediate RCRA closure and D&D. See #28 claim. "When/if the CPP-601 Deep Tanks are decommissioned, the WWH Tanks, vaults, and transfer lines will be upgraded. These upgrades would include replacement of the [non-compliant] tile encased transfer lines with piping that has secondary containment compatible with corrosives, lining of the vaults with stainless steel, and upgrade of the instrumentation, a sampler upgrade, and vessel offgas improvement."
    DOE wants to continue use of noncompliant systems which do not adequately protect the public health and safety. RCRA 40 CFR 270 permit only allows two modes; 1.) compliant operation, and 2.) implementation and completion of closure plan. DOE is in violation of both RCRA modes.

104. DOE acknowledges sparging in CPP-601 Deep Tanks which is an Air Stripping process under 40 CFR 63.680 that DOE is not in compliance with.

109. DOE claims no equipment related to CPP-603, However, DOE fails to include what the disposition of the CPP-603 fuel storage pool water will be and the transfer of this mixed waste via existing non-compliant waste lines and processing in the evaporators. This particular pool had/has extensively degraded fuel and baskets which ended up on the bottom of the pool. This pool water is a mixed waste. Therefore, DOE is not complying with RCRA by not including these waste lines and documenting the required double containment. 40 CFR 264.193

117. DOE failed to answer DEQ's important question that a door compromises the cell vault liners in PEWE EVAP-WL-129 and WL-161. Thus the RCRA requirement 40 CFR 264.193 for double containment is not met.
    The fundamental RCRA requirement of secondary containment liners within each tank cell is to facilitate immediate identification of a leak source so corrective actions can be taken. DOE's non-compliant interpretation of combining numerous tank cells compromises the intent of the RCRA regulation. This noncompliance could result in inability to locate and isolate leaks.

120. DOE fails to answer DEQ's question on details of "containment and leak detection system" in VES-WLK-197 and fully characterize the secondary containment in FRAC-WLK-171 and WLK-197 (i.e., is it a stainless steel liner??). If DOE does not provide this information, DEQ is obliged to assume it is non-compliant and reject RCRA Permit Application.

122. DOE fails to state the height of the door in FRAC-WLL-170 east wall. The three foot Stainless Steel liner is of little use if the door sill is below that liner level. The required RCRA secondary containment capacity to hold the total volume of the vessel can not be claimed by DOE.

123. DEQ's 40 CFR 264.193(f) challenge "that these [pipe] lines are imbedded in concrete wall but are not secondarily contained" is not adequately answered by DOE's response that claims that the concrete functions as a secondary containment. 40 CFR 264.193(f) requires compatible secondary containment with leak detection system. Concrete is not compatible with these corrosive wastes and there is no leak detection in the walls. If DOE's rationalization is accepted, then there would be no regulatory need for stainless steel liners in the tank cells or service piping.

124. DOE's reliance on "drip troughs" as secondary containment is non-compliant because the service lines utilize highly pressurized steam to move waste, which means a leak would not be contained in a "trough" resulting in an undetected leak. Additionally, the leak collection bottle capacity is unstated, and inadequate to hold a significant leak.

127. DOE fails to answer DEQ's challenge to possible lack of compliance with 40 CFR 264.90(b) and 264.101 by claiming ILWMS does not utilize "land treatment facilities." DOE states: "The groundwater monitoring requirements of 40 CFR 270.14(c) including IDAPA 58.01.05.008; 40 CFR 264.91 through 264.100 are not applicable to the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System [ILWMS] buildings as these buildings are not landfills, surface impoundments, waste piles, or land treatment facilities."
    The LET&D, part of the ILWMS, discharges millions of gallons of mixed waste water to the percolation ponds [the old ones and the new ones as well] which is "land disposal." Therefore, the regulations apply. The regulations apply because past discharges to the percolation ponds have resulted in contamination of the Snake River Aquifer, therefore the monitoring requirements are essential to ensure continued dumping of waste contaminates do not reach the aquifer.
    EPA issued a 12/4/02 Notice of Violation and Penalty Assessment of $175,000 for DOE's failure to prevent surface water from leaching high-level tank farm contaminates into the Snake River Aquifer.

129. DOE's response is inadequate to DEQ's challenge to provide specifics on inspections to the LET&D. Defense Facility Nuclear Safety Board (DNFSB) October 2, 2001 report identifies non-compliance issues related to the ETS [High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE) and the LET&D leaks which are not addressed in the DOE's NOD response. The DNFSB found significant leaks in these evaporators caused by the highly corrosive content of the waste being processed. RCRA requires compatible construction materials for waste processing units and/or shortened service life to prevent releases and leaks.
    Also see INEEL 10/4/02 "Science & Technology Needs Statement" related to major corrosion problems at the INTEC evaporators. This is a solicitation to contractors for solutions to the corrosion problems at all the ILWMS evaporators. INEEL notes chloride concentrations between 1,500 and 5,000 mg/L that are identified as the primary source of the corrosion problems. This contradicts DOE's statements in the RCRA Application (#51) that corrosive waste is not an operational problem because the concentration is kept below 1,100 mg/L.

137. DOE's response to DEQ's challenge on floodplain vulnerability is inadequate and not consistent with recent USGS Big Lost River flood reports. See EDI Amicus Brief in support of McCoy challenge to IDEQ RCRA INTEC Debris Processing permit.

138. DOE's response: "Contamination of water supplies by spills of mixed waste is prevented by building features such as high-density concrete base, stainless-steel lining, epoxy-coated walls, sloped floors trenches, drains, double-encased piping, and liquid collection tanks, as well as various means of leak detection" to DEQ's challenge on 40 CFR 270.14(b)(8)(iii) compliance is inadequate, given that leaks and spills have already been documented as contamination of the Snake River Aquifer.
    EPA issued a 12/4/02 Notice of Violation and Penalty Assessment of $175,000 for DOE's failure to prevent surface water from leaching high-level tank farm contaminates into the Snake River Aquifer. This Violation is yet to be corrected by DOE.

150. DOE's response; "The criticality alarm is provided solely for radiological protection. Therefore, the criticality alarm is not described in the [RCRA] Volume 14 Part B Permit Application." DOE's response related to inclusion of criticality alarms is inadequate because a criticality would release RCRA/CAA hazardous air pollutants and be a violation of 40 CFR 264 Subpart AA. ⁽³⁾

1. See attached October 2, 2002 letter of David B. McCoy to Brian R. Monson, DEQ at pages 1-3 regarding lack of interim status for the HLLWE (ETS). (Attachment A).

2. Memorandum in Support of Environmental Defense Institute Motion for Leave to participate as Amicus Curiae in Natural Resources Defense Council vs. Spencer Abraham, Secretary Department of Energy, Case No. 01-CV-413(BLW) filed August 2, 2002; See as Attachment B.

3. See attached October 2, 2002 letter of David B. McCoy to Brian R. Monson, DEQ regarding lack of criticality controls: The Part B Application fails to deal with the adequacy of controls to prevent criticality within the ILWMS system:

• •DOE should have to show how U-235 concentrations in the as-built conditions of the tanks will not be able to reach critical mass.
• •DOE has failed to determine the minimum critical mass for all the waste tanks associated with the ILWMS, including but not limited to the PEWE, the LET&D, the HLLWE and the Tank Farm Facility (TFF).
• •DOE has failed to set the storage limits for all tanks associated with the ILWMS as a percentage of the minimum critical mass.
• •DOE should show how tank geometry and placement are such that under actual operating conditions in the tanks as built and installed, critical mass will not be reached.
• •DOE should show what the existing condition of tanks are so that vessel integrity is assured.
• •DOE should show that it is capable of inspecting and has inspected all tanks for vessel integrity.
• •DOE should show what the expected layering effect is in the tanks for determining critical mass.
• •DOE should show that any assumptions regarding homogeneous solutions are true in actual operation of the tanks.
• •DOE should show any mechanisms whereby it claims homogenous mixing will be achieved.
• •DOE should show how precipitation in the tanks may affect the minimum critical mass.
• •DOE should show what actual precipitation and concentration of fissile material may be occurring in the tanks.
• •DOE should give the minimum critical mass under operating conditions for the tanks associated with ILWMS.
• •DOE should consider the factor of water reflection between tanks during operations.
• •DOE should consider the factor of water reflection between tanks during flood conditions.
• •DOE should consider under what conditions solutions in the tanks may precipitate out.
• •DOE should consider the minimum critical mass for each individual tank involved with the ILWMS and explain the administrative controls to remain under those limits.
• •DOE should explain whether the chemicals added to ILWMS treatment may cause precipitation.


 

Attachments :

Attachment A: Comments for Volume 14, Revision 0, Part B Permit Application for the INTEC ILWMS, EPA ID No. ID4890008952 submitted by David McCoy to B. Monson October 2, 2002.

Attachment B. Memorandum in Support of Environmental Defense Institute Motion for Leave to participate as Amicus Curiae in Natural Resources Defense Council vs. Spencer Abraham, Secretary Department of Energy, US Federal Court, District of Idaho, Case No. 01-CV-413(BLW) filed August 2, 2002